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Possessive Individualism at 50:
Retrieving Macpherson’s Lost Legacy
pet e r l i n d s ay

I went to the University of Toronto in the fall of 1983 to pursue a Master’s
Degree in what was then called Political Economy. I chose Toronto largely
because C.B. Macpherson taught there. Or so I thought. In those pre-
internet days, news traveled slowly, and while the brochure I had received
in the mail clearly listed him as a member of the faculty, I discovered when
I arrived that he had in fact retired.
As it happens, his physical absence hardly seemed to matter, as his
ideas—along with those of Allan Bloom, who was also no longer there—
permeated the air. It was easy to think about and find discussions of not
just Possessive Individualism, but also of his many essays on democratic
theory. When, after a four year absence in the mid-80s, I returned for doctoral work, I found no small amount of faculty support for a dissertation on
Macpherson’s democratic vision.
I mention this history because it is of a time that now seems quite remote.
Good old-fashion Marxist inspired leftism has almost a quaint air about
it, as the names of those whose works we debated endlessly—Miliband,
Poulantzas, Althusser, Marcuse (a friend of Macpherson’s), Fromm—now
create more nostalgia than they do internecine graduate student fighting.
So too does the name Macpherson, and, I would argue, we need, in marking the 50th anniversary of Possessive Individualism, to acknowledge that
fact. The book is fifty years old, but it was really only alive for about half of
that time. Part of the explanation for its decline is no doubt found in the
critiques—by Dunn, Skinner and others—of Macpherson’s interpretations
the good society , vol. 21, no. 1, 2012
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of Hobbes, Locke et al.1 Of at least equal significance, however, are the forces
that have undermined enthusiasm for much of the socialist left. Put simply:
Macpherson was too forceful a critic of capitalism for his work to remain
unscathed by that system’s perceived triumph over communism.
Or so I shall argue. When I say “too forceful” I do not mean to imply that
Macpherson’s critique of capitalism was where he went wrong. Actually,
I intend to make precisely the opposite point. To be more specific, my argument here is that while the central ethical commitment of the theory of
possessive individualism was anti-capitalist in nature—and for that reason
a difficult sell in today’s political climate—a close inspection of the manner
in which Macpherson employed that commitment
reveals a critical perspective that renders his work
Hobbes, Locke,
every bit as vital now as it was thirty, forty or fifty
and others
years ago.2
whose theories
I.

were imbued
with possessive
individualist
assumptions . . .
interested him
for the part they
played—wittingly
or not—in the
justification of
unjust property
relations.

Macpherson explained in the opening pages of
Possessive Individualism that the book’s central
concept is a form of individualism arising in the
seventeenth-century in which the individual is “seen
as essentially the proprietor of his own person or
capacities, owing nothing to society for them.”3 This
image was, Macpherson argued, brought to life in
the writings of liberal thinkers who took their cues
about the nature of individuals from the nascent
capitalist relations around them.4 In imbuing their
theories with this image, they managed, as have
their successors—and in Macpherson’s hands, there is no shortage of possessive individualists—to in turn justify those relations, for capitalism as an
ideal made sense only as long as humans were conceived in the possessive
individualist mode (which, as he later commented, was “a fairly realistic
conclusion at the time”5).
The logic of these justifications made them unassailable to anyone
unwilling to question the basic “postulates of human nature,” as Macpherson
was fond of calling them. And for those who did question them—J.S.
Mill and T.H. Green through to twentieth century liberals such as A. D.
Lindsay and Ernest Barker—the results were various forms of contradiction
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“involving the thinkers’ concealing from themselves the fundamental nature
of the problem.”6 As the possessive individualism postulates could not be
jettisoned “while market relations prevail,”7 critics of the possessive model
simply tacked on to them an “egalitarian complement.”8 This “concept of
man as at least potentially a doer, an exerter and developer and enjoyer
of his human capacities”9 resulted in “an uneasy compromise between
the two views of man’s essence, and, correspondingly, an unsure mixture
of . . . two maximizing claims made for the liberal-democratic society.”10
Thus while the theory of possessive individualism was initially an attempt
to bring to light the pervasiveness in liberal theory of market assumptions
about humans, it became, as Macpherson continued in subsequent works to
explore its normative implications,11 an attempt to expose much broader and
further reaching contradictions within what had become liberal-democratic
theory. As he put it, “Because Western democratic theory contains these
inconsistent postulates, its condition is internally precarious.”12
So far there is little to indicate why this theory might have come to
be neglected in the last twenty years. Even if Macpherson’s critics were
correct that early liberal thinkers were not drawing from nascent market
relations in their postulates about human nature, none, to my knowledge,
has suggested that these postulates are absent in their theories. (Rousseau,
after all, had argued something very similar when he pointed out that all
state of nature theorists, “speaking continually of need, avarice, oppression, desires, and pride, have transferred to the state of nature the ideas
they acquired in society.”13) Nor has there been criticism of the claim that
such postulates do indeed work to justify market relations (irrespective
of whether that justification was the intention of any particular thinker).
In fact, it is difficult to see how one could reject that claim. So what is the
problem here? Why is the theory of possessive individualism not still in
currency?
The answer, I think, has far less to do with Macpherson’s analysis of
liberal-democratic theories than it does with the normative position that
motivated it. He was, after all, targeting those theories not simply because
he, like Rousseau, saw them as anthropologically or ontologically incorrect.
Rather, he targeted them because of what they did, namely justify particular inequalities endemic to market relations.14 Hobbes, Locke, and others
whose theories were imbued with possessive individualist assumptions did
not interest him as subjects of intellectual history; they interested him for
the part they played—wittingly or not—in the justification of unjust property relations. His general thinking was that
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the maintenance [of any particular system of property] requires at least
the acquiescence of the bulk of the people, and the positive support of
any leading classes. Such support requires a belief that the institution
serves some purpose or fills some need. That belief requires, in turn,
that there be a theory which both explains and justifies the institution
in terms of the purpose served or the need filled.15
This, then, was the role of possessive individualist theories.
So what unjust set of property relations—what institution—did possessive individualism explain and justify? In discussing possessive individualism’s emphasis on humans as having unlimited desires, Macpherson
followed a causal chain to the source of the problem:
. . . the acceptance, by the most active part of
society, of the belief that unlimited desire is
natural and rational leads to the establishment
of the right of unlimited appropriation, which
leads to the concentration of ownership of the
material means of labour, which leads to the
continual transfer of powers.16

The “possessive”
in “possessive
individualism”
refers not to our
relationship with
commodities . . .
but rather to our
relationship with
our own labor.

This continual transfer occurs because men, as “proprietors of their own person or capacities,” are able to
“sell the use of their energy and skill on the market, in
exchange for the product or the use of others’ energy
and skill.”17 The source of the injustice was, then, the
wage relationship, a relationship made possible by “the individual right to
unlimited, or virtually unlimited, accumulations of property.”18 Possessive
Individualism (the book) did not dwell long on these concrete conditions, as
Macpherson’s focus was on the possessive picture of humanity that emerges
from Hobbes, et al. He did, however, in his discussion of Hobbes, outline the
features of “possessive market society,” emphasizing that “if a single criterion
of [this] society is wanted it is that man’s labour is a commodity.”19 Indeed,
this criterion makes this possessive “model of society” the only one (of three
he described) that “meet(s) Hobbes’s requirements:”
Only in a society in which each man’s capacity to labour is his own
property, is alienable, and is a market commodity, could all individuals
be in this continual competitive power relationship.20
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To sum up: the “possessive” in “possessive individualism” refers not to
our relationship with commodities (as is commonly supposed),21 but rather
to our relationship with our own labor. Specifically, it refers to the fact that
we can have a relationship with it; that it is thought of not as “us” but rather
as “ours.” (Try having a relationship with your leg.) This self-image—the
product of possessive individualist theories—in turn allows us to accept
the sale of labor to others, and it is this actual, concrete economic fact (the
existence of the wage relationship) that lies at the core of Macpherson’s
critical analysis. It is also what makes that analysis problematic in the era
that accepts the market in an increasingly uncritical fashion, for in attacking the commodification of labor, the theory of possessive individualism
attacks the market at its core.

II.
In most of Macpherson’s analysis of possessive individualism, Marx is not
mentioned. In fact Marx’s name only appears on two pages of Possessive
Individualism. Yet, as he makes clear on one of those two pages, his debt is
substantial:
The conception of possessive market society is neither a novel nor an
arbitrary construction. It is clearly similar to the concepts of bourgeois
or capitalist society used by Marx, Weber, Sombart, and others, who
have made the existence of a market in labour a criterion of capitalism.22
Indeed, while Macpherson did in subsequent writings say a bit more about
the concrete economic relations he viewed as unjust, he never actually
refined or added to Marx’s analysis; he simply appropriated it as his own.23
Whatever debt he owed “Weber, Sombart, and others” was never again
mentioned. Marx, however, remained a steady, if often unmentioned, voice
in his later writings. Irrespective of whether he himself was at some level
a Marxist—an issue I have always found uninteresting, if not silly24—he
clearly felt, as he once quipped, that “the utility of Marxism as a means of
understanding the world is increasing over time.”25
I highlight Macpherson’s embracing of Marx’s social analysis in order
to identify a crucial difference between the two. If Macpherson’s social
analysis was the same as Marx’s, the conceptual framework in which it was
delivered was emphatically not, and, as I shall suggest, it is precisely this
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perspectival difference that explains why the utility of Marxism as a means
of understanding the world has not increased over time, and why the utility
of possessive individualism need not follow the same path. To see this point,
we need to contrast the language each thinker used in discussing what, precisely, was the problem raised by the wage relationship. We turn first to Marx.
Marx’s first sustained analysis of the wage relationship is found in the
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, where he describes the
problem of that relationship as one of “alienation.” In the essay “Estranged
Labor,” he identifies four particular types of alienation: from the laboring
process, from the object of labor, from our “Species Being” and from each
other. The first thing to note in this account is how at least half of it rests
on some fairly ambiguous conceptual arguments. Whether we are alienated
from our Species Being will, of course, depend on what that is; an issue that
can hardly be resolved in the absence of some deep ontological claim. As far
as being alienated from our fellow human beings,
it is difficult to see how social separation—though
In attacking the
regrettable morally—could, despite its effects on the
commodification
individual, be constituted as a wrong in some politof labor, the theory
ical sense: if it is “wrong,” it is so only in a broad
sense that would be difficult to defend uncontroverof possessive
sially (“life shouldn’t be like that”). At a minimum it
individualism
seems unlikely that we can point, say, to any right (to
attacks the market
fraternity?) being violated.
at its core.
What, however, of alienation from the laboring
process and the product of our labor? How is the
essence of the problem described there? On the
laboring process, Marx’s language is particularly striking (and should draw
comparisons to Macpherson’s):
. . . labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his essential
being; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies
himself, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but
mortifies his body and ruins his mind. He is at home when he is not
working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the
satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to
it . . . Lastly, the external character of labor for the worker appears in
the fact that it is not his own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong
to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another . . .26

GS 21.1_10_Lindsay.indd 137

06/07/12 10:25 AM

138 |

the good society

| vol. 21, no. 1

Here alienation results in a condition of, as Wood has put it, “a person who
experiences life as empty, meaningless and absurd, or who fails to sustain a
sense of self-worth.”27 Troublesome as well is what the laborer creates:
The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer
belongs to him but to the object. Hence, the greater this activity, the
greater is the worker’s lack of objects. Whatever the product of his
labor is, he is not. Therefore the greater this product, the less is he
himself. The alienation of the worker in his product means . . . that the
life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something
hostile and alien.28
Again, the condition seems problematic, although it is difficult to know
how to characterize what is problematic about it. Is it that we fail to remain
attached to our deeper, ontological self   ? And what is
that? With respect to the products the laborer proMacpherson
duces, how precisely is he harmed in not being able
decoupled
to see himself in them?
liberalism from
I am not suggesting that there exist no wrongs
here,
only that one’s capacity to conceptualize them
the relations
as Marx did seems contingent upon acceptance of
of production
certain antecedent ontological claims.29 In some
to which he so
sense, this difficulty gets us to the heart of Marx’s
objected.
project. To translate the problem with wage labor
into one of injustice, where rights of the laborer are
violated, is to miss Marx’s larger message that talk of justice and rights is
hopelessly parochial, bound as it is to the very relations of production we
wish to call into question.30 Indeed, given that our conceptual understanding of justice and rights is, in his mind, the product of those relations, Marx
might have questioned even our ability to perceive the wage relation as an
injustice or a violation of rights.
At first glance, this claim seems similar to Macpherson’s argument about
the obscuring effects of possessive individualism. The difference, however,
is that Macpherson’s claims about liberal theory were divorced from a larger
theory of history. He was largely agnostic on the issue of how deeply tied
justificatory theory was to its material foundations. “I do not enter into the
general question of the primacy of ideas or material conditions,”31 he pronounced. Yes, Hobbes and Locke could be explained by the milieu in which
they wrote, but so too could Mill and Green. If the formers’ theories were
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merely “ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process,”32 the latters’
were proof that liberalism was not merely another moment in capitalist’s
epiphenomenal orbit. Marx spilled much ink—and more bile—decrying
Mill’s “shallow syncretism;”33 Macpherson, on the other hand, extolled his
ability to break free from the narrow confines of possessive thinking.
The difference, then, is that Macpherson decoupled liberalism from the
relations of production to which he so objected. His project was one of
“retrieval,” as he put it, not dismissal, a point he makes clear in the opening
pages of Possessive Individualism. If we are blinded by some liberalisms,
others might restore our sight. Whether he was “right” in some absolute
sense—whether we can indeed see and critique the relations of production
from some independent standpoint—is beside the point. What matters only
is that Macpherson’s critique is one that still has force in an era reluctant
to look beyond the realities of liberal individualism. Requiring no controversial ontological claims, Macpherson asks only that we view relations
of production from individualistic ideals spawned in their lifetime. More
pointedly, he asks whether those relations might actively subvert the very
ideals used to justify them.
In Possessive Individualism, Macpherson’s principal critique of the market was that by the twentieth century it had destroyed both the equality and
cohesion of interests that were the sine quo nons of political obligation.34
The problem was that “liberal theory must continue to use the assumptions of possessive individualism because they are factually accurate for
our possessive market societies.”35 Moreover, the market posed no inherent contradiction to the assumptions; indeed it vindicated the only sort of
freedom of which possessive individuals were capable. Liberals such as Mill
who rejected possessive assumptions as “morally offensive”36 were thereby
doomed to toil in unreality.
As Macpherson continued to work on problems in liberal-democratic
theory over the next twenty-five years, he expanded his understanding of
its internal contradictions beyond the issue of obligation. The problem
remained liberal-democratic theory’s “attempt to carry into the period of
mature capitalist society a combination of market postulates and egalitarian humanist principles which were not strictly tenable together even
when first compounded a century or more ago.”37 Yet what made the combination untenable was not simply that obligation was precluded, but that
one set of postulates (the possessive individualist ones) worked to justify
an economic system that contradicted the other (the egalitarian humanist principles). The market simply cannot generate a society of “doers
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and creaters.” Hence, the inclusion of the latter postulates had rendered
liberal-democratic theory self-contradictory.
We see, then, that while Marx’s claim is that the capitalist market contradicts larger concerns about a higher nature of humanity and human relations,
Macpherson saw no need to abandon the basic liberal-democratic ideals that
were “introduced into predemocratic liberal theory in the nineteenth century
to make it liberal-democratic.”38 To Marx’s claim that the system would collapse under the weight of its internal structural contradictions—falling rates
of profit, proletarianization, concentration of capital—Macpherson argued
that the contradiction was between a functioning market system and the ideals of human life understood on its own terms. Put simply: Marx rose above
liberalism, Macpherson stayed within it.

III.
Let me be clear about why this last distinction matters. I am making no
claims here about the ontological adequacy of either Marxism or liberalism.
In truth, I have always been drawn to the implications of Marx’s analysis
of alienation—to the very ideas that I earlier suggested were ambiguous
and reliant on controversial ontological claims.39 What I have always found
appealing about Macpherson, however, was his determination to liberalize
those claims. As a first rate historian of political thought, Macpherson
taught his readers that there was within the liberal tradition a rich vision
of human life, one that held much of the appeal of Marx’s40 (and that was
in fact “fundamentally the same as the Marxian concept”41), but one that
also avoided the political ramifications that came with Marx’s corresponding theory of history. In short, Macpherson’s critique of the wage relationship demonstrated that “revisionism” need not accept the baggage with
which Marx had laden it. Seen through a wide enough historical lens, one
that looked beyond its possessive moments, liberalism could offer a vision
expansive enough to challenge the wage relationship, and it could do so
using the market’s own analytic framework.
The advantage of Macpherson’s perspective is plain: to engage in debate
over the wage relationship without recourse to justice or a concern for
rights is to argue at cross paths with one’s antagonists, all the more so in
the past twenty years. Even if Marx is correct that, “liberty as a right of man
is not based on the association of man with man but rather on the separation of man from man,”42 it would still be important to question whether
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the capitalist market is really the most effective means to protect its own
conception of rights and to realize its own understanding of justice. Thus,
to ground a critique of property rights in the claim that “the rights of any
man which are morally justifiable . . . are only those which allow all others
to have equal effective rights”43 is to point out that property rights must at
a minimum be justifiable on basic liberal principles. Macpherson’s demonstration that rights derived from possessive postulates could not rise even
to this challenge allowed him to arrive at a position both radical and liberal.
Rather than overcoming liberalism, Macpherson contested its meaning:
A liberal position need not be taken to depend forever on an acceptance of capitalist assumptions, although historically it has been so
taken. The fact that liberal values grew up in capitalist market societies
is not in itself a reason why the central ethical principle of liberalism—
the freedom of the individual to realize his or her human capacities—
need always be confined to such societies.44
In Macpherson’s hands, then, the transcendence of capitalism could occur on liberal terms;
terms that emphasized the importance of both
civil liberties45 and human rights. As long as liberalism was viewed from the proper historical
perspective—as “an assertion of the right to all to
full human development”46—it alone could reveal
the inadequacies of the market system.

Marx rose
above liberalism,
Macpherson stayed
within it.

IV.
So how, then, does the wage relation pose contradictions for liberalism? In
what way is a “fully human life” subverted by a productive process in which
laborers play no part in deciding what is produced, when it is produced,
how it is produced or why it is produced? The salient moral issue is not the
distribution of the means of production, as it is, for instance, in the analytic
critiques of Roemer47 and Arneson.48 The issue, rather, is with respect to the
effect that distribution has on the participants in the productive process.
Macpherson was particularly concerned about the effects on two institutions crucial to the liberal ideal: those of democracy and those of property.
I shall close by examining how the wage relation undermines each one.
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First democracy. We can begin with democracy in its most generic sense,
something akin to Dewey’s claim that it “consists in having a responsible
share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the
groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the
values which the groups sustain.”49 While this understanding of democracy highlights the potential conflict between the wage relationship and
democratic principles, it also points to a number of ways in which the two
might have little or no bearing on one another. Suggesting conflict is the
idea that the laborer, insofar as he or she belongs to the productive process,
should have a responsible share in forming and directing the activities of
that process. The same words also point to reasons for being wary of seeing conflict, however, for skeptics could ask: In what sense does the laborer
“belong” to the productive process? Moreover, there is the issue of whether
a “responsible” share is necessarily inconsistent with an unequal one.
Both issues point to the fact that the applicability of democratic principles rests on how we might adjudicate prior questions about the nature of
the productive process, for the imposition of the democratic lens has normative force only if we accept the prior claim that the productive process
should be democratic. (The claim, for example, that family relations do not
meet with democratic standards is more of an observation than a normative critique.) In short, we need first to determine the extent to which the
productive process is similar to or different from the society that Dewey,
among others, had in mind.
In Macpherson’s hands such concerns are quickly brushed aside, for
boundaries between democratic and non-democratic realms are blurred,
if not torn asunder. In an essay written twenty years before Possessive
Individualism, Macpherson argued that,
If we think of democracy as not merely a set of institutions . . . but as
a set of purposes or ends to which these institutions are but means,
it is surely legitimate to hold that any other institutions, including
economic ones, which can be shown to be also essential means to the
democratic ends are equally entitled to the shelter and support of the
word democracy.50
The idea that democracy was not merely a political concept but a broader
social one (a “normatively structured way of life” as John Keane described it51),
remained at the heart of Macpherson’s thought until his death. So too did the
claim that democracy was not just about “having a responsible share accord-

GS 21.1_10_Lindsay.indd 142

06/07/12 10:25 AM

l i n d s ay | Retrieving Macpherson’s Lost Legacy | 1 4 3

ing to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which
one belongs” but also that it involved “moving towards a firmly-held goal of
an equal society in which everybody can be fully human,”52 or, as he later formulated it, in which there was an “equal opportunity to use and develop and
enjoy whatever capacities each person has.”53 Indeed, it is this broader conception of democracy’s meaning that explains Macpherson’s insistence on looking
beyond political institutions.54 If the goal is to be fully human, then (assuming
democratic control as seen as an integral aspect of that goal), the activities over
which one needs control would necessarily encompass the whole of one’s life.
To go even further, the activities of particular importance will be those
that get to the heart of “doing” and “creating;” namely those surrounding
our productive, laboring lives. In discussing movements for the democratic
participation in decision making in the workplace, Macpherson captured
what was at stake:
Those involved in workers’ control are participating as producers, not as
consumers or appropriators. They are in it not to get a higher wage or
a greater share of the product, but to make their productive work more
meaningful to them. If workers’ control were merely another move in
the scramble for more pay to take home . . . it would do nothing . . .
to move men away from their image of themselves as consumers and
appropriators. But workers’ control is not primarily about distribution
of income: it is about the conditions of production . . .55
Whether empirically true or not, the statement speaks to Macpherson’s
(and Marx’s) central claim that how we produce is of vital importance to
the way in which we conceive of ourselves, (and, ultimately, who we are).
Far from being a controversial ontological claim, the insight here relies only
on the observation that labor is, in fact, a part of us (and that it is only in
light of an historical turn in seventeenth century liberal thought that we
have come to think otherwise). From that perspective it is the wage relationship that reflects and embodies an ontological mistake (or at a minimum, an
extremely controversial claim), one whose correction requires a democratic
ideal that, in calling for a fully human existence, insists upon the return of
what the capitalist market structure has taken:
Now there can be no doubt that democratic control is incompatible
with the corporate freedoms that are needed for maximum capital
accumulation. Capital has every reason, for the sake of its own liberties,
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to resist democratic control. An unlimited property right cannot
co-exist with democracy.56
In subjecting the wage relation to a democratic litmus test, Macpherson
saw as the task not to overthrow the market, but only to rein in its antidemocratic effects. What mattered was the degree to which, to alter Dewey
slightly, “the laborer has a responsible share according to capacity in forming
and directing the activities of the productive groups to which he belongs.”
Whether that share is received will depend not on the existence (or lack
thereof) of the wage relation, but on its terms. Moreover, any advances
toward the democratic ideal would themselves depend upon a democratic
process, one that hinged as much on advances in public perception as it did
on any underlying structural change. As Macpherson put it: “the possibility of a genuinely participatory democracy emerging
in Western liberal-democratic states varies inversely
Critics of the
with their electorates’ acceptance . . . of the possesmarket, if we are
sive individualist model of man.”57
to hear them at all,
The wage relationship was not simply a demomust demonstrate
cratic problem, for the inequality of access to the
means of labor that it entailed “also contradict[ed]
that market
one of the basic justifications of the . . . institution of
property rights will
individual property, namely, that human needs cannot get us where
not be met without that institution.”58 In his writings
we want to go . . .
on property, Macpherson began with the concept
as liberals.
in its broadest sense, one that abstracted away from
any particular mode of production. At this level,
property is, in Tawney’s words, “a moral right, and
not merely a legal right, because it insures that the producer will not be
deprived by violence of the result of his efforts.”59 What market society had
done, via the wage relation, was to sever this all-important link between
labor and its fruits. As such, its very rationale (which was, as Green put it,
“that everyone should be secured by society in the power of getting and
keeping the means of realizing a will”60) had been undermined.
In response, Macpherson worked to reconnect readers to conceptions
of property that the market and its justifying theories had occluded:61
The validity of the case for property as a necessary human right
depends . . . on whether we take property in the modern narrow sense,
or in the more extended and more natural sense of an individual right
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both to some exclusive property and to some non-exclusive right of
access to the remaining natural resources and the accumulated capital
of a given society. If we continue to take it in the modern narrow sense,
the property right contradicts democratic human rights. If we take it
in the broader sense, it does not contradict a democratic concept of
human rights: indeed it may bring us back to something like the old
concept of individual property in one’s life, liberty, and capacities.62
Elsewhere, he was more specific:
As soon as a property in things is derived from an exclusive right which
is at the same time an alienable right, i.e., the right to or property in
one’s labour, the damage is done: property as a right needed by all to
enable them to express their human essence is denied to many.63
In short, certain forms of property are consistent with the ideal of the institution itself and certain forms are not. In adopting the latter forms, market
societies not only lose sight of property’s fundamental meaning, they also
abandon the very principles upon which they were built.

V.
Again, I have no wish to promote Macpherson at the expense of Marx.
As I have suggested, most of these arguments are wholly consistent with
Marx’s thinking. Like Macpherson, Marx sought to salvage property, not
to destroy it (“that there can be no production and hence no society where
some form of property does not exist is a tautology”64), he did so by taking
aim at its most recent form (“the distinguishing feature of Communism
is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois
property”65), and he did so on exactly the same grounds as Macpherson
(“[c]ommunism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products
of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the
labour of others by means of such appropriation66).
The problem of Marx has less to do with the substance of his message
than it does with its ability to be heard. And yet, critiques of the market
are as vital now as they were in 1962, or, for that matter, 1862. Perhaps more
so. Environmental degradation, growing income inequality, high rates of
unemployment and, for those who do have jobs, a steady erosion of labor
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rights all provide adequate evidence, for those who care to listen, that the
market’s “triumph” is a hollow one. The question is who will care to listen.
Or, more to the point: to whom will they listen?
Critics of the market, if we are to hear them at all, must demonstrate that
market property rights will not get us where we want to go . . . as liberals.
They must demonstrate why that is, and then they must demonstrate why
an alternative set of property rights is to be preferred. But most importantly,
they must, after defending such a set of rights, be able to close the argument
as follows:
Would a liberal-democratic theory which embodied the new concept of
property still be in any significant sense a liberal theory? That depends,
of course, on what you put into liberalism. If you insist that it must
mean all the market freedoms . . . then clearly a political theory built
around the new concept of property could not be called liberal. But if
you take liberalism to be essentially an assertion of the right to all to full
human development . . . then a political theory built around the new
conception of property is eminently qualified as liberal theory . . . . [A]
new, less historically inhibited, paradigm of property would not destroy
but would liberate the essential liberal-democratic theory.67
Peter Lindsay is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Philosophy
at Georgia State University. He is the author of Creative Individualism: The
Democratic Vision of C. B. Macpherson as well as articles on political theory
and education in journals such as Polity, Social Theory and Practice, History
of Political Thought, and PS: Political Science and Politics.
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